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That Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land. . .Until 
the Local Government Can Turn It for a Profit: A Critical 
Analysis of Kelo v. City of New London  
 
“The Courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be 
disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequences 
would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the 
legislative body.” 
- The Federalist No. 78 
 
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kelo v. City of New 
London, arguably the most controversial case in American history 
concerning the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.1 The majority in 
Kelo determined that a public benefit satisfied the public use requirement 
of the Fifth Amendment.2 In her dissent, Justice O’Connor claimed the 
use of eminent domain is only lawful when private property owners are 
imposing costs on others, such as in blighted neighborhoods.3 In his 
dissent, Justice Thomas claimed that Berman v. Parker and Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff were both improperly decided and that Kelo 
could not possibly be a lawful use of eminent domain.4
Because the Berman and Midkiff interpretations of public use were 
tenuous at best (these decisions equated public benefit and public 
purpose with public use), the Supreme Court had the latitude to find for 
the respondent in Kelo without overturning either of their two previous 
decisions.5 The holding in Kelo is detrimental for property owners 
because it allows perceived economic benefits to qualify as a public use 
 1. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 4. See id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 5. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-32 (1954) (holding a redevelopment plan to remove 
blight conformed to the statutory language in providing for a public benefit); Haw. Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (holding the regulating of a land oligopoly scheme 
was rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, and, therefore, was a valid exercise of the 
eminent domain power); see discussion infra Part  IV.A. Given that Justice O’Connor wrote for the 
unanimous court in Midkiff and dissented in Kelo, she obviously believed that Midkiff did not dictate 
the decision in Kelo. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 231; Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
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for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Given that all redevelopment is for 
economic gain, it is difficult to imagine a government imposed taking for 
redevelopment that would not satisfy this standard. 
This note will examine how another jurisdiction has approached the 
same issues presented in Kelo. 6 A recent Michigan case could serve as a 
model for lawmakers and judges in curtailing the abuse of eminent 
domain by greedy governmental entities: The Michigan Supreme Court 
overturned a twenty-year old precedent and determined that economic 
development was not sufficient as a public use to justify a taking of 
private property.7 Additionally, this note will discuss legislative reactions 
to the decision in Kelo, both on the federal and state levels, and what can 
be done by states to protect their resident property owners.8 
 
I.  TAKINGS 
 
The Declaration of Independence first underscored the importance of 
property ownership in a free society by providing for a common goal of 
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”9 Scholars of constitutional 
law agree that “property is the foundation of every right we have, 
including the right to be free.”10 The philosopher John Locke, the 
primary source of inspiration for the Founding Fathers, included life, 
liberty, and estates in his conception of property.11 James Madison 
clarified this idea when he said, “As a man is said to have a right to his 
property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.”12 More 
recently, another advocate of free market and private property rights 
observed, “economic freedom is the foundation of our individual 
freedom.”13 Tellingly, Americans are driven daily to work in order to 
acquire property as a means for guaranteeing their independence.14
 6. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 7. Compare Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) 
(per curiam) with County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004). In Poletown, the 
Michigan Supreme Court determined that the possibility of increased jobs and increased tax revenue 
was a public use because it would benefit the public. In Hathcock, however, the Michigan Supreme 
Court expressly overturned Poletown and held that perceived economic benefits were not enough to 
justify the use of eminent domain in transferring property from private owners to private entities. 
 8. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, pmbl. (U.S. 1776). 
 10. Cato Handbook on Policy, 226 (6th ed. 2005). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Testimony on Takings of Private Property: Presented Before the Senate State Affairs 
Committee, 79th Second Called Session (Tex. 2005) (statement of Bill Peacock, Economic Freedom 
Policy Analyst, Texas Public Policy Foundation), available at http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/ 
2005-07-06-BP-senate.pdf [hereinafter Peacock]. 
 14. Cato Handbook on Policy, 227 (6th ed. 2005). 
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According to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, the federal 
government may not take private property for public use without just 
compensation.15 When a legislative body passes a law that restricts how a 
property owner may use his property, a regulatory taking occurs. A long 
line of cases address various issues surrounding regulatory takings, 
namely whether or not a taking occurs and how much of a loss in value 
occurs to the property owner.16 In some cases, no compensation is due; 
however, in other cases, if the regulation “goes too far,” then just 
compensation is due to the property owner.17 To determine whether or 
not compensation is due, the courts balance the general public interest 
and welfare against the magnitude of the taking.18 Courts consider three 
factors: (1) the property owner’s financially backed expectations in 
developing the property at the time of purchase;19 (2) any denial of 
economic use of the property;20 and (3) the complete loss in economic 
value or productivity to the property owner which would lead to an 
automatic taking warranting just compensation.21 With steady increases 
in environmental regulations, regulatory takings have been center stage 
of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence for the last twenty years.22
Another form of a taking is the physical taking of property through 
the use of eminent domain power. According to the Supreme Court, 
physical taking occurs when private property is taken by a government 
entity, through the power of eminent domain, for a public use; the 
governmental entity then provides just compensation to the owner for the 
property.23 The traditional purposes for physical takings are purely public 
uses: parks, hospitals, schools, highways, and common carrier 
transportation, such as railroads and airports.24 As early as 1789, in 
Calder v. Bull, the Supreme Court recognized that the Public Use Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment was intended as a limit on governmental use of 
the eminent domain power.25 With respect to the transfer of private 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 16. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 
438 U.S. 104 (1978); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Lucas 
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 17. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
 18. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492. 
 19. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). 
 20. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 501. 
 21. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017. 
 22. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Conti v. United States, 291 
F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 23. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24. 
 24. Id. at 128. 
 25. 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
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property from A to B (both private entities), the Court stated, “It is 
against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with 
SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done 
it.”26
The Amicus Curiae Brief submitted in Kelo v. City of New London 
by the Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc. highlighted some 
important historical jurisprudence surrounding takings.27 The idea that 
government cannot take private property for use by another private entity 
was put to the test during the late 1600s through the early 1800s in a line 
of cases commonly referred to as the Mill Acts cases.28 The Mill Acts 
passed by the various states authorized states to condemn private land 
which was necessary for the operation of mills.29 More specifically, a 
land owner on one side of a river could have the land on the other side of 
the river condemned so that he could dam the river and provide power 
for his mill.30 While it would seem this constituted the taking of private 
land to give to another private entity, it was, in actuality, more similar to 
the use of eminent domain in order to facilitate public utilities.31 At that 
time, and until the invention of the steam engine in the 1860s, water was 
the main source of power.32 The Court explained the use of water was 
necessary for the production of food and thereby constituted a public use 
for purposes of satisfying the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.33 
Once the mills were built, the access and price for products were 
regulated by the government, bolstering the concept that this was a 
public use.34 Just like public utilities, roadways, schools, and hospitals, 
the grist mills were necessary for the well-being of the general public—
an obvious public use. 
While the controversy surrounding regulatory takings has gained 
notoriety during recent years, the Public Use Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment has not received much attention until very recently. 
Although the Supreme Court addressed the public use requirement of 
physical takings in Berman v. Parker in 1954,35 thirty years lapsed before 
 26. Id. at 388. 
 27. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc., et al. at 15, 
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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they returned to the same issue in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.36 
It then took an additional twenty years following the Midkiff decision for 
the Supreme Court to address the issue in the recent case, Kelo v. City of 
New London.37 Relying heavily on Berman and Midkiff, the Court in 
Kelo ultimately determined that a transfer of private property to a private 
entity indeed satisfied the public use requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment.38
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In January 1998, the State of Connecticut authorized a $5.35 million 
bond issue to support the redevelopment of the Fort Trumbull area of 
New London, Connecticut (New London).39 In February 1998, Pfizer 
Corporation announced it would build a $300 million facility in the Fort 
Trumbull area of New London.40 In May of the same year, after initial 
approval from the city council and neighborhood meetings to discuss the 
plans, New London authorized the New London Development 
Corporation (NLDC) to submit plans to the appropriate state agencies for 
approval.41
In 2000, New London approved a development plan intended to 
revitalize the distressed city through increased tax revenues and creation 
of jobs.42 In order to implement the plan, New London began to purchase 
needed land from willing sellers and proposed to use the power of 
eminent domain to obtain the land from unwilling landowners in 
exchange for just compensation.43 New London intended to acquire land 
in seven parcels: parcel one for a waterfront hotel and conference center, 
parcel two for eighty new residences as part of a new urban 
neighborhood, parcel three for research and development office space for 
either Pfizer or other new businesses, parcel four that would support 
either the park or the marina, and, parcels five, six, and seven for 
additional office and retail space, parking and water-dependent 
commercial uses.44
Petitioners, including Suzette Kelo, brought suit in December 2000 
in the Superior Court of Connecticut, claiming “that the taking of their 
 36. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 37. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 38. See id. at 2655-68. 
 39. See id. at 2659. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 2658. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 2659. 
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properties would violate the ‘public use’ restriction in the Fifth 
Amendment.”45 The petitioners own fifteen properties in the Fort 
Trumbull area, four of which are in parcel three of the development plan 
and the other eleven are in parcel four of the development plan.46 The 
Superior Court granted relief in the form of a restraining order as to the 
properties located in parcel four (park or marina support), but denied 
relief to those properties located in parcel three (office space).47
Both parties brought appeals in the Supreme Court of Connecticut, 
which upheld the trial court’s determination as to the properties located 
in parcel three; however, the court reversed the trial court as to parcel 
four.48 The majority found the statutory language relied upon by New 
London to be valid and constitutional.49 The statute “expresses a 
legislative determination that the taking of the land, even developed land, 
as part of an economic development project is a ‘public use’ and in the 
‘public interest.’”50 However, “[t]he three dissenting justices would have 
imposed a ‘heightened’ standard of judicial review for takings justified 
by economic development” under Connecticut law.51 The dissenting 
justices agreed that the redevelopment plan was intended to serve for a 
“valid public use,” but found all the takings unconstitutional because 
New London “failed to adduce ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that the 
economic benefits of the plan would in fact come to pass.”52 Evidence 
considered by the court included detailed plans submitted by the New 
London Development Corporation stating purposes for the disputed 
parcels of land, even though the ultimate disposition or owners of the 
properties was not ascertainable at that time.53 Subsequently, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to “determine whether a city’s decision 
to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the 
‘public use’ requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”54
 
 
 
 45. Id. at 2660. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2660-61. 
 49. Id. at 2660. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 2661 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 587-88 (Conn. 2004) 
(Zarella, J., joined by Sullivan, C.J., and Katz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)) 
 52. Id. (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 587-88 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, 
J., joined by Sullivan, C.J., and Katz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)) 
 53. See id. at 2661-62. 
 54. Id. at 2661. 
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III.  EMINENT DOMAIN AND PUBLIC USE: USING POLICE POWER 
JUSTIFICATION TO REMEDY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ILLS 
 
The Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment permits the 
government to take private property if it is taken for public use.55 As 
discussed above, the Public Use Clause has not traditionally been the 
core of litigation surrounding the Fifth Amendment; however, in Kelo v. 
City of New London, the Supreme Court addressed the issue, basing its 
decision on its earlier rulings in Berman and Midkiff.56
 
A.  Berman v. Parker: Use of Eminent Domain to Remedy Social Ills 
 
In Berman, petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the District 
of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.57 The statute authorized the 
District of Columbia to seize property through eminent domain power for 
“the redevelopment of blighted territory in the District of Columbia and 
the prevention, reduction, or elimination of blighting factors or causes of 
blight.”58 Once the redevelopment plan was approved, the agency created 
by the Act was “authorized to acquire and assemble the real property in 
the area” necessary to fulfill the plan.59 The Act also specified 
“[p]reference is to be given to private enterprise over public agencies in 
executing the redevelopment plan.”60
Berman owned a department store in a blighted area slated for 
redevelopment.61 Although the store was a successful business in an 
otherwise blighted neighborhood, the district court allowed the taking of 
Berman’s property as part of the overall redevelopment scheme.62 
Berman argued that his property could “not be taken constitutionally for 
 55. U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
 56. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663. 
 57. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954); see also District of Columbia Redevelopment 
Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 592, 60 Stat. 790 (1946). 
 58. Berman, 348 U.S. at 29. Even though the statute being challenged in Berman provided 
for blight removal, the statute did not define blight.  Id. at 28 n.1. However, the Supreme Court 
relied on other language in the statute to define blight: 
substandard housing conditions’ means the conditions obtaining in connection with the 
existence of any swelling, or dwellings, or housing accommodations for human beings, 
which because of lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or light, or because of 
dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement, or any combination of these 
factors, is . . . detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the inhabitants . . . .  
 Id. 
 59. Id. at 29-30. 
 60. Id. at 30. The Supreme Court ultimately concurred with the legislature by stating that 
private development corporations were better suited to carry out redevelopment plans. Id. at 33-34. 
 61. Id. at 31. 
 62. Id. 
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[the] project. It [was] commercial, not residential property; it [was] not 
slum housing; it [would have been] put into the project under the 
management of a private, not a public, agency and redeveloped for 
private, not public, use.”63 The Court seemed to agree with Berman, 
stating, “[t]o take for the purpose of ridding the area of slums is one 
thing; it is quite another . . . to take a man’s property merely to develop a 
better balanced, more attractive community.”64
 
The Court distinguished the removal of slums from pure economic 
redevelopment based on the existence of conditions in slums that might 
be “injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare.”65 In the 
Court’s opinion, the use of traditional police power authority to protect 
the public from these possible harms justified the use of the eminent 
domain power for the redevelopment plan.66
 
In an effort to avoid “suffocating the spirit,” the Court imposed its 
own philosophical reasons when formulating its determination that the 
public good was best served by the taking of private property.67 The 
Court also justified the taking of private property to give to another 
private entity by stating, “The public end may be as well or better served 
through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of 
government—or so the Congress might conclude.”68 Further, “[w]e 
cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the 
public purposes of community redevelopment projects.”69
Berman claimed that his business did not endanger the health or 
safety of the public, nor did it contribute to the slum or blighted area.70 
The experts who designed the development plan argued the plan had to 
be executed as a whole, requiring the taking of Berman’s property, in 
order for the plan to be successful in restoring the neighborhood.71 The 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 32. The Court explained 
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and 
crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live 
there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. 
They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which 
makes it a place from which men turn.  The misery of housing may despoil a community 
as an open sewer may ruin a river.   
Id. at 32-33. 
 67. Id. at 32-33. 
 68. Id. at 33-34. 
 69. Id. at 34. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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Court held the standards set out in the redevelopment plan to be 
reasonable, and justified the taking of Berman’s property.72 The Court 
ultimately claimed “If owner after owner were permitted to resist these 
redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was 
not being used against the public interest, integrated plans for 
redevelopment would suffer greatly.”73
This reasoning highlighted the failure of the Court to adhere to the 
true essence of the Fifth Amendment in protecting private property from 
government intrusion, and the Court did not rectify the situation by again 
relying on similar reasoning in Kelo. Instead, the Berman case authorized 
use of eminent domain power to take property from one private owner 
and give it to another private owner if the overall purpose was to remedy 
social ills such as blight and slums.74 Thirty years later in Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Supreme Court further eroded Fifth 
Amendment protections for private property owners when it equated the 
perception of economic injustice with actual social injustice, which was 
justified by the Court in Berman, and held that remedying economic 
injustice was a permissible public use that could justify the taking of 
private property.75
 
B.  Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: Use of Eminent Domain to 
Remedy Economic Ills 
 
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the petitioner challenged the 
constitutionality of the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967.76 The Act 
provided for the taking of private property by the state government to 
make land available for sale to private, individual buyers.77 By 
condemning the land for resale, the Hawaii Legislature expected to 
redistribute the land from a small number of owners to other residents of 
the state.78 The Act provided that individuals who lived on a leased plot 
of land at least five acres in size could ask the State to condemn the land 
and sell it to them.79 The statute was designed to remedy economic ills 
brought about by a land oligopoly.80 The question presented to the 
 72. Id. at 35. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 76. Id. at 234-35. 
 77. Id. at 233. 
 78. Id. The Hawaii Legislature found the state and federal government owned nearly 49% of 
the State’s land, while only 72 private landowners owned another 47% of the State’s land. Id. at 432. 
 79. Id. at 233. 
 80. See id. at 233-35. 
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Supreme Court was “whether the Public Use Clause of [the Fifth] 
Amendment . . . prohibits the State of Hawaii from taking, with just 
compensation, title in real property from lessors and transferring it to 
lessees in order to reduce the concentration of ownership of fees simple 
in the State.”81 The Court held the statute did not violate the Public Use 
Clause of Fifth Amendment.82
The Court relied heavily on Berman v. Parker in its determination of 
a public use.83  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor stated, 
“Where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to 
a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated 
taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”84 The Court reasoned 
that “[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic 
exercise of a State’s police powers.”85 It did not matter whether the Act 
actually achieved its goals, but rather that its purpose was to benefit 
society as a whole by remedying perceived social and economic ills 
preserved by a land oligopoly.86 Justice O’Connor explained the Hawaii 
statute’s purpose was “not to benefit a particular class of identifiable 
individuals but to attack certain perceived evils of concentrated property 
ownership in Hawaii—a legitimate public purpose.”87 Therefore, the 
Court concluded that use of eminent domain power to achieve that 
purpose was not irrational.88
 
C.  Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Right: The Problems with Berman and 
Midkiff 
 
The broad definitions of public use fashioned by the Berman and 
Midkiff Courts paved the way for future distortion of the Public Use 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Berman allowed for the transfer of 
private property to a private entity in order to remove blight and protect 
the health, welfare, and safety of the citizens of the District of 
Columbia.89 By allowing a non-blighted property to be included in the 
permissible taking of blighted properties, the Berman Court drew no 
boundaries as to where public benefit (the removal of blighted 
properties) would give way to an impermissible taking (the removal non-
 81. Id. at 231-32. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 241. 
 85. Id. at 242. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 245. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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blighted properties).90 Midkiff allowed for the transfer of private property 
to a private entity in order to cure social ills brought about by a 
traditional land ownership scheme that provided an inequitable 
distribution of wealth for the residents of Hawaii.91 In essence, the 
Midkiff Court allowed a private entity to condemn private property (with 
the state of Hawaii’s blessing) and sell that property to private 
individuals—hardly a public use.92 In justifying such a decision, the 
unanimous Midkiff Court reasoned the inequities provided by the 
traditional land ownership scheme harmed the public at large, and the 
remedy provided by the Hawaii Housing Authority conferred a public 
benefit.93 Both the Berman and Midkiff decisions sought to remedy 
perceived harm present in the general public.94 Both decisions equated 
public benefit with public use, which set an apparently nonrestrictive and 
incredibly subjective standard for future cases challenging the Public Use 
Clause.95 Indeed, according to an amicus brief filed on behalf of 
petitioners, “Berman and Midkiff provide minimal guidance for 
determining when the purpose to be accomplished through a 
condemnation is a public use.”96 After all, what benefits a portion of the 
general public (the post-condemnation recipient of the property in 
question) confers harm on another portion of the general public (the 
owner of the property in question) through the loss of private property. In 
Kelo, the Supreme Court stretched the holdings from Berman and Midkiff 
to allow for the transfer of private property to a private entity simply to 
improve the local economy, not to remove blight or remedy social ills 
brought about by an inequitable land ownership scheme. 
 
IV.  THE EXACERBATION OF EMINENT DOMAIN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Over eighty years ago, Justice Holmes ominously cautioned, “We are 
in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public 
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut 
than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”97 Mindful of that 
 90. See id. 
 91. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
 96. Brief of Amicus Curiae of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock and Pacific Legal 
Foundation, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108). Timothy Sandefur 
further stated, “Midkiff asserts that eminent domain may not be used for private purposes, but when a 
government agency asserts that a condemnation is a valid public purpose, the courts generally take 
their most deferential perspective in reviewing that assertion.” Id. 
 97. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
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warning, the elusive goal of improved economic conditions should not 
suffice to justify the use of eminent domain power to transfer property 
from one private owner to another. 
 
A.  The Kelo Catastrophe: Eminent Domain Used to Improve Economic 
Conditions 
 
In what was arguably the most important property rights case in 
recent memory, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to determine if the 
redevelopment of a neighborhood by a corporation justified the taking of 
private property.98 The Superior Court of Connecticut had held because 
the corporation planned to restore park areas, increase jobs for the area, 
and restore residential living to the area, the city of New London’s 
seizure and redistribution to NDLC was a justifiable use of eminent 
domain power.99 The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to determine 
whether a city’s decision to take property for the purpose of economic 
development satisfies the ‘public use’ requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment.”100 The Court heard oral arguments on February 22, 2005, 
and rendered its decision on June 23, 2005.101
 
1.  Speculative public benefits as a public use 
 
Given there was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose in Kelo, it 
was accepted that New London’s development plan was not adopted “to 
benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.”102 In this case, the 
majority justified the taking because it would be carried out in 
accordance with a “carefully considered” development plan, which 
would benefit the general public.103 Justice Stevens, writing for the 
majority, conceded “the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking 
petitioners’ land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a 
particular private party.”104 Additionally, Justice Stevens said, “Nor 
would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a 
public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private 
benefit.”105
New London was not confronted with the issue of removing blight, 
 98. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005). 
 99. See id. 
 100. Id. at 2661. 
 101. Id. at 2655. 
 102. Id. at 2662 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)). 
 103. Id. at 2661 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004)). 
 104. Id. (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245). 
 105. Id. 
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but only with improving an economically distressed neighborhood; there 
was no potential harm for the residents as a result of their living 
conditions and no evidence of crime as a result of the condition of the 
neighborhood.106 Because the redevelopment plan was a proposed 
remedy to the situation, the Court viewed the plan as a viable option in 
New London’s furtherance of that goal.107 The Court considered the 
redevelopment plan as a whole, rather than its specific parts, and 
concluded that the proposed plan better served the general public.108
In denying petitioners’ plea for a bright-line rule that would deny 
public use status for economic development, the Court stated, 
“Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted 
function of government. There is, moreover, no principled way of 
distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes 
that we have recognized.”109 This reasoning was flawed because Berman 
and Midkiff themselves demonstrated a method of distinguishing the 
different public purposes. The opinions in those cases were based on the 
use of states’ police power to remedy perceived social ills in the general 
public brought on by severe blight and inequitable land oligopoly 
schemes.110 These social ills were perceived as being harmful to the 
general public, and tradition dictated that it fell within the states’ power 
to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens.111 No 
similar situation existed in New London; there was no evidence of harm 
to the general public brought about by the conditions present in Susette 
Kelo’s neighborhood.112
Justice Stevens explained that the holding in Berman extended 
beyond the removal of blight—it also allowed the taking of a non-
blighted department store to achieve the larger goal of area 
redevelopment.113 The comparison ignored that the purpose of the 
redevelopment plan for New London was not to remove blight from the 
area, but ostensibly to improve the local economy. The taking of 
petitioners’ land was part of a larger scheme; however, the general 
purpose did not measure up to the Berman standard of blight removal. 
Further, Justice Stevens noted, “[t]he owner of the department store in 
Berman objected to ‘taking from one businessman for the benefit of 
 106. Id. at 2664-65. 
 107. Id. at 2665. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 
(1984). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664-65. 
 113. Id. at 2665 n.13. 
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another businessman,’ referring to the fact that, under the redevelopment 
plan, land would be leased or sold to private developers for 
redevelopment.”114 According to Justice Stevens, the Berman Court’s 
rejection of that contention was relevant to Kelo because “[t]he public 
end may be as well or better served through an agency of private 
enterprise than through a department of government—or so the Congress 
might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method 
of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment 
projects.”115
The potential implications of Justice Stevens’ words are quite 
alarming for home and business owners in the United States: If economic 
stability is now a ‘public use,’ it would be easy to justify practically any 
taking for development by a private party with deeper pockets than the 
government. A shopping mall or strip center would provide greater 
economic benefits to the local government, through property and sales 
taxes, than a low- to middle-class neighborhood. Given that every 
redevelopment plan is contrived to prosper, it is difficult to imagine any 
such plan not passing the Kelo standard, thereby subjecting private 
property owners to the greedy whims of the local government. 
Furthermore, the admission that Congress might conclude private entities 
are better suited to carry out redevelopment plans highlights a serious 
problem: private entities with deeper pockets than private citizens will be 
far more persuasive with the local government. 
Finally, the Kelo majority refused to create a test defining public use 
for future cases.116  Plaintiffs argued that “without a bright-line rule 
nothing would stop a city from transferring citizen A’s property to citizen 
B for the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more 
productive use and thus pay more taxes.”117 The Court responded 
 
Such a one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of 
an integrated development plan, is not presented in this case. While 
such an unusual exercise of government power would certainly raise a 
suspicion that a private purpose was afoot, the hypothetical cases 
posited by petitioners can be confronted if and when they arise. They 
do not warrant the crafting of an artificial restriction on the concept of 
public use.118
 
 114. Id. at 2666. 
 115. Id. (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 33). 
 116. Id. at 2666-67. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 2667. 
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Leaving the flood gate open for future cases challenging the Public Use 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Court guaranteed the future 
emergence of costly litigation.119
Since the majority opinion in Kelo was a determination of the 
constitutionality of a local ordinance in New London, the holding does 
not reach other states through constitutional interpretation.120 
Undoubtedly, however, the Kelo holding opens the door for even more 
challenges to the constitutionality of state and local laws governing 
eminent domain. Notably, the majority stated, “Nothing in our opinion 
precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the 
takings power.”121
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy pointed to evidence 
presented in the trial court that New London’s development plan was 
comprehensive and warranted the taking of any and all property to 
achieve its goal of economic improvement in a distressed area.122 Justice 
Kennedy also addressed the lack of a test for future cases: “My 
agreement with the Court that a presumption of invalidity is not 
warranted for economic development takings in general . . . does not 
foreclose the possibility that a more stringent standard of review . . . 
might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn category of takings.”123 
Justice Kennedy further explained, “There may be private transfers in 
which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties 
is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is 
warranted under the Public Use Clause.”124 Unwilling to formulate a test 
on his own, Justice Kennedy opined that, for now, Kelo follows Berman 
and Midkiff, and until a different fact scenario warrants a test, it was not 
necessary for the Court to address any hypothetical situations.125
 
2.  Public use means specific use by the general public 
 
In a scathing dissent by Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Kelo minority warned, 
“Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now 
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so 
long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a 
 119. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 120. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 2669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 123. Id. at 2670. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public—in the 
process.”126 This was an ominous warning for property owners 
nationwide given that the conversion of residential property into 
commercial property would always produce greater economic benefits to 
the local economy, thereby constituting a public use under the Kelo 
majority holding. 
Justice O’Connor explained that while the Court has historically 
given full deference to legislatures in determining the bounds of public 
use, leaving the public/private distinction solely to the political branches 
would render the Public Use Clause “little more than hortatory fluff.”127  
The danger in leaving the full determination to local governments rests in 
the opportunity for corruption by those private entities looking for a 
profit.128 Additionally, Justice O’Connor stated that two categories of 
uses, defined by the Court, have unilaterally justified physical takings: 
(1) transfer “private property to public ownership—such as for a road, a 
hospital, or a military base;” and (2) “transfer private property to private 
parties, often common carriers, who make the property available for the 
public’s use-such as a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium.”129 Only in 
rare circumstances, such as those in Berman and Midkiff, had the Court 
departed from these guidelines.130
Interestingly, Justice O’Connor wrote the unanimous opinion in 
Midkiff while she dissented in Kelo, demonstrating a distinction between 
the two cases. Justice O’Connor pointed out that in Berman the blighted 
neighborhood was composed of 64.3% dwellings that “were beyond 
repair.”131  The blight presented injurious conditions to the general public 
and the redevelopment plan for the neighborhood had the primary 
purpose of remedying social ills to preserve the health and safety of the 
general public.132 Even though Mr. Berman’s store was not blighted, the 
Court deferred to the legislature in determining that the entire area was 
needed in order to implement the redevelopment plan for the public 
good.133 Justice O’Connor pointed out different social ills that were 
present in Midkiff, namely an inequitable distribution of land based on 
traditional distribution schemes that denied property ownership to a 
majority of the state’s citizens.134 Justice O’Connor repeated an 
 126. Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 2673. 
 128. See id. at 2675-76. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 2674. 
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admonition from Midkiff, “A purely private taking could not withstand 
the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate 
purpose of government and would thus be void.”135 In both Midkiff and 
Berman, the public purpose was accomplished when the harmful status 
of the property was eliminated. 
In Kelo, New London did not claim that the plaintiffs’ homes were a 
source of “social harm,” nor could New London make that claim without 
clearing the way for any single home to be condemned in order to erect 
an apartment building, retail store, or church.136 Justice O’Connor further 
clarified the distinction between the Berman and Midkiff cases and Kelo 
 
In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of 
harmful property use, the Court today significantly expands the 
meaning of public use. It holds that the sovereign may take private 
property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, 
ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate 
some secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue, 
more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure. But nearly any lawful use of 
real private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to 
the public. Thus, if predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side-effects 
are enough to render transfer from one private party to another 
constitutional, then the words “for public use” do not realistically 
exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the 
eminent domain power.137
 
This factual distinction existed in the use of a state’s police power to 
provide for the health and safety of its citizens in both Berman and 
Midkiff.138 Right or wrong, the use of police power to abolish harm to the 
general public has been deemed a valid public use, but such conditions 
were not present in Kelo. Even though there was a misuse of this power 
in Berman and Midkiff, it is important to consider the similarities and 
differences between those two cases and Kelo because the majority in 
Kelo so heavily relied upon them.139
As for the lack of a test presented by the majority or concurring 
opinions in Kelo, Justice O’Connor speculated that the future of takings 
is sure to be detrimental to private property rights.140 Criticizing Justice 
 135. Id. (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)) 
 136. Id. at 2675. 
 137. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Kennedy’s concurrence, Justice O’Connor suggested that courts will 
have no standard by which to judge future cases with even slightly 
different facts from Kelo: “Whatever the details of Justice Kennedy’s as-
yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but the ‘stupid 
staffer’ failing it.”141 Finally, Justice O’Connor noted the problem with 
economic development takings is that private benefits and incidental 
public benefits become difficult to distinguish and mutually 
reinforcing.142
Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissent presenting issues not 
considered by the Court.143 In adhering to originalism as his method of 
constitutional interpretation, Justice Thomas turned to “founding-era 
dictionaries” to define the term “use.”144 According to its Latin origin, 
the term use means “to use, make use of, avail one’s self of, employ, 
apply, enjoy, etc.”145 Given that definition, Justice Thomas stated it is 
difficult to say the public is employing property when the government 
takes it from the private owners and transfers it to another private 
owner.146 Justice Thomas pointed to two other instances in the 
Constitution where the term use appears; in both instances, the narrower 
meaning given in the Latin definition is undeniably understood.147
Justice Thomas further argued that the Berman and Midkiff decisions 
were improperly decided, and suggested that those decisions should be 
reconsidered by the Court.148 In justifying his sentiments, Justice Thomas 
argued the police power relied upon in both prior cases was actually used 
to remedy a public nuisance; therefore, the takings were not really 
takings and just compensation was not due to the property owners when 
their property was taken to cure a social ill.149 According to Justice 
Thomas, the misapplication of Berman and Midkiff to the present case 
hinged on the principle that the power of a state to take property using 
police power and the power of a state to take property using the power of 
eminent domain are two separate legal concepts.150
Finally, Justice Thomas criticized the majority for not presenting a 
 141. Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26 n.12 (1992). “[T]his 
amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.” Id. at 1026.) 
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test to be used in future cases.151 Justice Thomas explained, “It is far 
easier to analyze whether the government owns or the public has a legal 
right to use the taken property than to ask whether the taking has a 
‘purely private purpose’ -unless the Court means to eliminate public use 
scrutiny of takings entirely.”152 As Justice Thomas eloquently stated, 
“Obliterating a provision of the Constitution, of course, guarantees that it 
will not be misapplied.”153 The lack of a test for future cases assures 
uncertainty and inconsistency in takings jurisprudence. 
 
B.  The Michigan Model: Limits on Public Use Property Owners Can 
Tolerate 
 
As one commentator noted in January 2005, “[s]o rank have been the 
outrages [of recent property rights decisions] that . . . the Michigan 
Supreme Court expressly overruled its Poletown decision . . . .”154 In 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, the Michigan 
Supreme Court approved the use of eminent domain to transfer private 
property to a private entity for economic gain; however, in Wayne 
County v. Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme Court expressly overruled 
Poletown, holding that mere improvement in economic conditions did 
not constitute a public use.155 The test for public use formulated in 
Wayne County v. Hathcock should serve as a model to other jurisdictions 
struggling with the concept of public use in justifying a taking. 
 
1.  Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit: Possible 
economic benefits erroneously qualify as a public use to justify use of 
eminent domain 
 
The 1981 Michigan Supreme Court case of Poletown Neighborhood 
Council v. City of Detroit involved a plan for the City of Detroit (Detroit) 
to acquire, through eminent domain if necessary, “a large tract of land to 
be conveyed to General Motors Corporation as a site for construction of 
an assembly plant.”156 Plaintiffs were comprised of a neighborhood 
 151. Id. at 2686. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Doug Bandow, Legal plundering Eminent domain equals corporate welfare, WASH. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at A19, available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3518 (last 
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association and affected residents of the Poletown area of Detroit.157 The 
primary issue brought before the Michigan Supreme Court was whether 
the taking of the property from one private owner to give to a private 
entity for redevelopment purposes constituted a public use.158 The court 
held there was an ascertainable public benefit when condemnation power 
was used to take private property and give it to a private entity for 
development which created more jobs.159 The court explained, “[T]he 
condemnation power is exercised in a way that benefits specific and 
identifiable private interests, a court inspects with heightened scrutiny 
the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being 
advanced.”160 The court’s reasoning focused on the depressed economy 
in the area and the creation of new jobs, which would benefit the public 
as a whole.161 In his dissent, Justice Fitzgerald reasoned, “It is only 
through the acquisition and use of the property by General Motors that 
the ‘public purpose’ of promoting employment can be achieved. Thus, it 
is the economic benefits of the project that are incidental to the private 
use of the property.”162 The taking of the property in Poletown would 
only pass the public purpose test after given to a private entity and this, 
according to the dissent, violated previous case law in Michigan.163
In a more sweeping dissent, Justice Ryan predicted “[t]his case will 
stand . . . despite the sound intentions of the majority, for judicial 
approval of municipal condemnation of private property for private 
use.”164 Distinguishing the cases relied upon by the majority to justify the 
public use involved, Justice Ryan said the use of eminent domain power 
in the Slum Clearance cases was a valid public use because the purpose 
of the condemnation used in such cases is not to convey it to a private 
entity, “but to erase blight, danger and disease.”165 Further, Justice Ryan 
stated, “In the case before us the reputed public ‘benefit’ to be gained is 
inextricably bound to ownership, development and use of the property in 
question by one, and only one, private corporation.”166 Therefore, the 
resulting public benefit is not determined by the public, but solely by a 
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 160. Id. 
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private corporation.167 Twenty-three years later, however, in Wayne 
County v. Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme Court would revisit the issue 
of public use and find the holding in Poletown to be an abomination 
upon private property rights.168
 
2.  Wayne County v. Hathcock: Possible economic benefits do not 
qualify as a public use to justify the exercise of eminent domain 
 
Poletown was recently overturned by the Michigan Supreme Court 
and accordingly, the court narrowed the definition of public use.169 In 
Wayne County v. Hathcock, the court determined that the taking of 
property from one private owner to give to another for development, for 
the sole purpose of economic benefits, was not justifiable.170
In Hathcock, Wayne County wanted to use its eminent domain 
power to condemn defendants’ real properties for the development of an 
office and technology park.171 The owners of those properties alleged 
that the condemnations exceeded Michigan constitutional bounds.172 The 
Pinnacle Project proposed to create more jobs and increase the tax 
revenue for the county.173 Wayne County was able to procure many of 
the tracts needed through voluntary sales by the property owners; 
however, other landowners were not willing to sell and they brought suit 
to stop the condemnations.174
Several issues were initially presented to the Michigan courts, 
including a challenge to the constitutionality of the condemnations based 
on the argument that the Pinnacle Project did not serve a public 
purpose.175 Based on Justice Ryan’s dissent in Poletown, the Michigan 
Supreme Court outlined a three-prong test for the circumstances which 
qualify as a public use 
 
(1) where “public necessity of the extreme sort” requires collective 
action; (2) where the property remains subject to public oversight after 
transfer to a private entity; and (3) where the property is selected 
because of “facts of independent public significance,” rather than the 
interests of the private entity to which the property is eventually 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id.; Wayne County v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
 169. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765. 
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transferred.176
 
Applying this test, the court first determined the Pinnacle Project was not 
exclusively dependent on defendants’ land. The court reasoned that this 
country is “flecked with shopping centers, office parks, clusters of hotels, 
and centers of entertainment and commerce” and collective action was 
not necessary to achieve the project’s goals.177 In addition, the Pinnacle 
Project did not provide for public oversight once transferred to a private 
entity for development.178 Wayne County intended the “private entities 
purchasing defendants’ properties to pursue their own financial welfare 
with the single-mindedness expected of any profit-making enterprise.”179 
Any public benefit arising from the Pinnacle Project was contingent on 
the actual development of the property by private entities.180 The private 
entities were not to be held accountable to any public entity for actually 
developing and maintaining the property acquired for the purpose of a 
public benefit.181 Finally, the court determined that nothing about the 
condemnations required by the Pinnacle Project served the public 
good.182 Unlike other cases relied upon in Poletown, there were no facts 
of independent significance, “such as the need to promote health and 
safety” that might justify the condemnations.183
Citing Justice Ryan’s dissenting opinion in Poletown, the Michigan 
Supreme Court pointed out that, prior to Poletown, the Michigan courts 
had never gone so far as to equate a “generalized economic benefit” with 
public use.184 In overturning Poletown, the court held “[justifying] the 
exercise of eminent domain solely on the basis . . . that the use of the 
property by a private entity seeking its own profit might contribute to the 
economy’s health is to render impotent our constitutional limitations on 
the government’s power of eminent domain.”185 While the Michigan case 
was not controlling for the rest of the country, it reflected a growing 
 176. Id. at 783 (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 
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sentiment in protecting private property from physical takings that 
convey the property from one private owner to another for the sole 
purpose of speculative public economic benefits. 
 
3.  If Suzette Kelo lived in Michigan. . . 
 
Applying the test from the Michigan Supreme Court to the facts in 
Kelo would have undoubtedly produced a different outcome for Suzette 
Kelo. First, the disputed tracts of land in Kelo were not necessary to 
implement the development plan.186 At the time of the original lawsuit, 
plans for the disputed tracts of land were unclear and certainly not so 
unique as to require specific tracts of land – the tracts were to be used for 
a park or marina and additional office space.187 Arguably, a park or 
additional office space do not require specific tracts of land, whereas a 
marina only requires waterfront property, which was readily available 
otherwise.  Second, the disputed property would not remain subject to 
public scrutiny once acquired through condemnation and conveyed to a 
private entity, the NLDC.188 Lastly, the selection of the disputed property 
was not based on facts of independent significance regarding the 
property itself, such as blight, but, rather, the property was specifically 
chosen for the primary benefit of the private entity.189 If Suzette Kelo 
lived in Michigan, she and the other plaintiffs would still own their 
homes today. The Hathcock decision went further in protecting private 
property rights than did Kelo by disallowing economic redevelopment as 
a public use. This increased protection of private property rights would 
also likely pass constitutional muster as a heightened restriction on 
takings, especially given that Kelo passed constitutional muster as an 
abhorrent infringement on private property rights. 
 
4.  Legislative Action to Limit Public Use in Response to Kelo 
 
Within five days of the announcement of the Kelo decision, Sen. 
John Cornyn (R-TX) proposed the Protection of Homes, Small 
Businesses, and Other Private Property Rights Act of 2005, which would 
withhold federal funds from states that use eminent domain power for 
economic development.190 In the findings of the proposed legislation, 
 186. See discussion supra Part II. 
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Sen. Cornyn specifically criticized the Supreme Court for their decision 
in Kelo and urged Congress and the states to take action to reign in the 
decision.191 The proposal would exclude economic development as a 
public use: “the term ‘public use’ shall not be construed to include 
economic development.”192 The proposed legislation would apply to all 
exercises of eminent domain power by the federal, state, and local 
governments through the use of federal funds.193 Such swift, strong 
action by Congress echoed property owners’ reactions to the Kelo 
decision across the nation.194
Governor M. Jodi Rell and other Democratic leaders of Connecticut, 
the state of origin for Kelo, compared the public reaction to the Boston 
Tea Party195 and “call[ed] on local municipalities to observe a 
moratorium on using their eminent domain powers until lawmakers can 
figure out what to do next.”196 Connecticut Republican leaders have 
proposed three different amendments to current law to “restrict eminent 
domain use . . . but all three failed amidst Democratic opposition.”197 
Perhaps due to pressure from property owners of both political parties, 
Democrats in the Connecticut Legislature subsequently called for 
hearings on the matter, which Governor Rell supported.198
Prior to the Kelo decision, several states retained laws against the use 
of eminent domain for economic development: “At least eight states, 
including A[rkansas], F[lorida], K[entucky] and M[aine], already bar 
using eminent domain as an economic development tool, while U[tah] 
and N[evada] passed laws last year that greatly restrict the practice.”199 
On the other hand, five states (Kansas, Maryland, New York, North 
Dakota, and Minnesota) currently have laws which expressly allow the 
use of eminent domain for economic development.200 In the aftermath of 
the Supreme Court decision in Kelo, several states have considered 
legislation to guard against similar outcomes.201 States that have 
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considered such legislation in the summer of 2005 are: California, 
Tennessee, Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, Georgia, 
Missouri, Idaho, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Virginia.202 While it is 
desirable that states formulate their own more restrictive definitions of 
public use, the expense of such legislation could have been avoided by a 
different holding in Kelo. Furthermore, property owners in states like 
Kansas, Maryland, New York, North Dakota, and Minnesota would have 
been given greater protection than their state legislatures are willing to 
provide. 
In Texas, Governor Rick Perry added the issue of eminent domain to 
a special legislative session originally called to discuss education.203 Both 
Texas legislative houses passed bills limiting eminent domain; however, 
state legislators did not reconcile the two versions of the bills before the 
first special session ended.204 The bills sought to remedy the current law 
surrounding takings in Texas, which “are so eaten away by exceptions 
and limitations that, in the end, takings causes of action are created only 
in certain limited circumstances.”205 During a second special session, 
however, Senate Bill 7 passed both houses and is awaiting action by 
Governor Perry.206
Alabama was the first state to actually pass legislation specifically 
designed to counteract the holding in Kelo.207 During a special legislative 
session, Governor Bob Riley signed a bill that prohibits local 
government from taking private property in order to give it “to retail, 
industrial, residential, or office developers.”208 Governor Riley explained 
that the Court’s ruling in Kelo was “‘misguided’ and a ‘threat to all 
property owners.’”209 Bolstering sentiments across the country, Governor 
Riley stated, “A property rights revolt is sweeping the nation, and 
Alabama is leading it.”210 Notably, the Alabama law does permit physical 
takings for private development if it is determined the properties are 
 202. See Changes, supra note 200. California bills are A.C.A. 22 and S.C.A. 15; Tennessee 
bills are H.B. 2426, S.B. 2413, and S.B. 2418; Delaware bills are S.B. 217 and S.B. 221; Florida bill 
is H.B. 31 [2006]: Minnesota bills are H.B. 117a, H.B. 118a and H.B. 123a; and, New Jersey bill is 
A.C.R. 255. Id. 
 203. Egan, supra note 199. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Daniel Anderson, The Texas “Takings” Statute: Ten Basic Facts to Know, 60 TEX. B. J. 
12, 14 (1997) [herinafter Anderson]. 
 206. National Conference of State Legislatures, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs 
/natres/post-keloleg.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2005). 
 207. Donald Lambro, Alabama Limits Eminent Domain, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, 
available at http://washtimes.com/national/20050804-120711-4571r.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2005) 
[herinafter Lambro]. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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blighted. This traditional view of eminent domain law remains within the 
bounds of the holding of Berman.211
 
V.  CONCLUSION: CAVEAT EMPTOR! 
 
As Kelo demonstrates, a more definitive test for public use is needed. 
If the Supreme Court is unwilling to draw a line, then the States must do 
so. Even so, the question remains: Whose job is it to draw the line in the 
sand? Traditionally, the legislatures defined the laws that governed their 
people; however, in recent years, the task seems to have fallen more and 
more into the hands of the judicial branch. In the absence of stricter state 
definitions of public use, the Supreme Court is left to apply its own 
factual analysis of whether or not a taking for a public use has occurred. 
Without a test to apply, this presents a difficult task. When five men and 
women can so disastrously change the course of private property rights, 
with no check on their power to do so, the purpose of having written 
laws and elected officials to enforce them becomes obsolete. If the 
Framers intended for the Constitution and the rights it affords to change 
so dramatically over time, they would have left blanks to be filled in 
later. The Framers did not do this. Instead, the Framers did provide for a 
constitutional amendment process that could be used to redefine or 
expand the Constitution.212 As a matter of fact, they left very specific 
language to guide our interpretation in the future: “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation.”213 Timothy 
Sandefur of Pacific Legal Foundation points out that “Madison, who 
wrote the Public Use Clause, explained that government was created to 
‘impartially secure[ ] to every man whatever is his own.’”214 Sandefur 
continues, “But strong interest groups – or ‘factions,’ as [Madison] called 
them – could take over the government and use it to their own benefit by 
stealing the property of their opponents.”215 Surely, “public use” was 
never meant to be construed as the possibility of increased tax revenue 
for the local government.216
According to the majority in Kelo, a “possible” public benefit is 
 211. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954); Lambro, supra note 211. 
 212. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 213. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 214. Brief of Amicus Curiae of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock and Pacific Legal 
Foundation, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted). 
 215. Id. 
 216. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).  “The City has carefully 
formulated an economic plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, 
including-but by no means limited to-new jobs and increased tax revenue.” Id. 
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enough to satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.217 
Justice O’Connor stated public use is satisfied only when a private 
property owner is imposing a cost on others, such as in the case of blight, 
slums, and land oligopolies.218 Justice Thomas argued that none of the 
uses described by the majority or by Justice O’Connor satisfy the Public 
Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment.219 Justice Thomas emphasized the 
need to revisit the holding in Berman and Midkiff in order to avoid 
stretching the law so far as to include public economic benefits as a 
public use.220 Barring legislative action by all fifty states to restrict the 
definition of public use and protect private property owners, the remedy 
suggested by Justice Thomas is the best scenario for avoiding further 
miscarriages of justice. Revisiting Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo in hopes of 
finding a consistent justification for public use that does not infringe on 
private property owners for the benefit of private parties seems like the 
next step in this debate. Ironically, given the public outcry against the 
holding in Kelo, the Supreme Court may get the chance sooner rather 
than later. 
 
Sonya D. Jones* 
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